Very often, the card reading assemblies in self-service terminals are a primary target for manipulation-attempts and skimming-attacks. This is because a user, attempting to use the self-service terminal that in particular can be an ATM, requires a banking-card that usually comprises a chip and/or a magnet strip on which card data including the personal customer and account access data are stored. Unfortunately, many self-service terminals are manipulated by third persons in order to obtain these data in a criminal manner. Amongst other techniques a spy-device is tried to be inserted into the card-slot of the card reading assembly in an inconspicuous manner, wherein this spy-device is capable to directly read out the magnetic strip or to attach to an internal interface (such as an USB-interface) of the card reading-device. By this method the bank-data of the card can be read in order to produce an illegal copy of the card. Moreover, skimming-attempts are known in which an alien card reader device is attached to the card reading assembly as an unobtrusive superstructure, capable to e.g. send the read out card data via a radio transmission. If the fraudster is also capable to obtain the security number (PIN) of the card he/she can easily withdraw money from accompanying account. Moreover, skimming-attacks are known in which an internal interface directly stimulates a card reading process and manipulates the software control of the self-service terminal (or ATM).
Moreover, direct trapping of a card (Card Trapping) is another known attack scenario. Within this trapping scenario a superstructure is attached to the card reading assembly to steal the card. This superstructure which is directly mounted behind the card slot comprises a loop for one-directionally inserting card. Once a customer inserts a card, said card is captured by the loop which prevents the card from being ejected again. By this behaviour the user believes his card to be (rightfully) withheld and he consequently leaves the self-service terminal. In the following the deceiver takes the card together with the superstructure.
In order to detect card trapping, the process of card-retract has been modified in the prior art. The card is first retracted, then driven out and then retracted again by the card reading assembly. If this method is not possible in a perfect manner, i.e. ejecting a card is not possible, it can be assumed that a card theft has been attempted. However, this security method/approach increases the transaction time at the device.
It is also known to counteract such manipulation attempts of self-service terminals be using sensors. The German patent application DE 196 05 102 A1 discloses to use one or more infrared sensors for safeguard the self-service terminal, wherein the signals of these sensors are processed by an evaluation device to detect superstructures.
In the German patent application DE 10 2008 012 231 A1 a protection device is proposed that comprises a protection-shield-generator and a connected induction coil to create an electromagnetic protection shield that covers the electromagnetic fields which are created during (illegally) reading-out the card and therefore influence/interfere the functionality of the alien card reading assembly such that it fails to deliver useful data. To avoid that the deceiver may detect this protection device, the electromagnetic protection-field is generated with a special protection signal simulating a standard card-reading signal that only contains unuseful pseudo-data. However, this protection device can not be used to avoid or impede such skimming-attempts that are directly targeted to the interior of the card reading assembly and e.g. receive signals from an inserted spy-device or even from an interior data interface.
In this context there is also to mention the German patent application DE 10 2009 019 708 A1 which discloses to create a stray-field via permanent magnets that are moved by piezo-elements, in order to generate an induced magnetic alternating field which effectively interferes the skimming card reading assembly while reading-out the data. Furthermore the European patent application EP 1 394 728 A1 is cited in which supersonic sensors are disclosed to detect an attached superstructure to the self-service terminal. But also these solutions are not capable to avoid or impede skimming-attempts that occur in the interior of the card reading assembly.
In the US patent application US 2006/0249574 A1 the misuse of a card is mentioned, but not a manipulation within the interior of the card reading assembly as such. Herein, it is proposed to equip the card with a microcontroller and an encryption function (cf. FIG. 2). For the power supply of the microcontroller there are photovoltaic or piezo-electric components proposed. However, monitoring of or defense against skimming-attempts via sensors is not described.
Furthermore, it is well known to protect devices that are commonly used to store money or valuables, in particular vaults or bank-vaults with sensors. For instance the German patent application DE 2 318 478 A1 discloses a monitoring system for a strongroom, in which supersonic-sensors are used to determine motions therein via the Doppler-effect. Another disclosure that is relying on an ultrasonic alarm mechanism is disclosed in the German patent application DE 2 617 467 A1.
Accordingly, conventional self-service terminals comprise a card reading chamber into which a card can be inserted that contains data to be read, wherein the self-service terminal comprises at least one sensor for defence against manipulation attempts and an evaluation device. However, these solutions are not capable for protection against manipulations attempts that aim on the interior of the card reading assembly.
Accordingly, the conventional self-service terminals are equipped with a card reading assembly, which has an accommodation chamber for a card on which data to be read is stored, whereby the self-service terminal itself can be equipped with at least one sensor system and an evaluation device connected to it in order to prevent manipulation attempts. However, these solutions are not suitable for effectively preventing manipulation attempts aimed at the interior of the card reader device.
The terms natural frequency and mode are defined below.
Particularly well suitable frequencies for a chamber or a device/body that encloses a chamber are called natural frequency. If a natural frequency assumed to be a flat wave spreads in a chamber or body in all directions of coordinates, the reflections on the walls create a large number of waves, which overlap at each chamber point/body point according to their phase position. This results in ranges with predominantly constructive interferences and those with predominantly destructive interferences. The resulting pattern is called eigenmode.
It is therefore the objective of the present invention to further develop a card reading assembly of the kind mentioned above, so that attempts at manipulation and skimming attacks aimed at the interior and exterior of the card reading assembly are safely repelled or at least effectively hindered.
In particular, the housing for mounting the card reader device should receive a higher level of security through appropriate data processing and analysis. Any attack on the card reader device should be detected. The system should be highly available and robust, as false alarms often lead to a lack of attention or to the safety device being switched off.
An authorization concept for technician/engineer operations at the safety devices is required. The authorization can be done, for example, analogous to the authorization of the device user, i.e. with card and PIN or by using the CryptaStick or authorizations via the SOP (software operator panel).
A self-service terminal equipped with such a card reading assembly and a method of monitoring such a self-service terminal will also be presented.